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T

he price of a barrel of crude oil
doubled within a few months last year.
Although prices have been easing lately,
for those who paid more than $3 for a
gallon of gas, the memory is not likely
to fade quickly. But worries about
higher gas prices don’t end at the pump.
Oil price shocks—sudden and sharp
increases in the price of oil and its
derivatives like gasoline—are associated
in the popular mindset with an unavoid
able descent into inflation. Ask just
about anyone about the inflation of the
1970s, for example, and they’re likely
to associate it with the oil crisis that
occurred early in the decade.
Many economists have also held the
view that oil shocks can lead to
inflation—although not directly or
inevitably, but because of the way
monetary policy responds when there
is a shock.
What do the latest round of oil-price
increases bode for inflation? We trace
the path of an oil shock through all
sectors of the U.S. economy and demon
strate that such shocks do not cause
inflation. They can, however, cause
other unpleasant economic repercus
sions. We identify the sectors that suffer
the highest long-run price increases after
an oil shock and find that they are
among the most capital-intensive in the
economy, suggesting that an oil shock
may actually increase the relative prof
itability of capital in a few sectors that
can pass increased costs onto con
sumers. One reassuring result of our
analysis is that it seems likely that our
economy may now be less dependent
on oil, so that this time around, the
consequences of an oil shock may be
less severe.
ISSN 0428-1276

■

Guilt by Association

Figure 1 presents some historical data on
oil prices and inflation in the United
States. A cursory glance at the figure
suggests that a doubling of oil prices
leads to double-digit price increases. It’s
no wonder people associate oil shocks
with inflation.
But an oil price shock is an increase in
the real price of a commodity that will
be passed on to other sectors of the econ
omy. Since the shock is a one-time
increase in the price of oil, by definition
it cannot be considered inflationary.
Inflation, instead, is a persistent rise in
prices, sustained year after year. Such a
persistent rise can only be caused by the
monetary authority, when it creates too
much money.
It is possible that the Fed has responded
to past oil shocks by creating inflation—
intentionally, to ease the blow of the oil
shock—or accidentally, because the oil
shock distorted information about how
much money the economy needed.
Some economists argue that is the case.
But that oil price shocks have been
viewed as inflationary is really guilt by
association.
To be sure, even if an oil price shock
doesn’t cause inflation, the consequences
of one can be severe. Because so many
other commodities depend on oil for their
manufacture or distribution, an oil shock
can ripple through the economy, raising
the prices of many goods and services.
Those higher prices, in turn, can cause
people hardship and force adjustments
elsewhere in the economy.

Oil price shocks do not cause infla
tion, no matter how close the connec
tion seems to be in our practical expe
rience. But they can cause significant
price increases throughout the econ
omy. Tracing the way a sharp
increase in the price of crude oil
affects prices in various industrial
sectors of the U.S. economy suggests
how big these increases are. Fortu
nately, our economy seems better
prepared now to weather such shocks
than in the 1970s and 1980s.

■

Commodity Price Effects

What are the aggregate price effects of
an oil shock, isolated from the monetary
policy response? To answer that ques
tion, we follow the price effects of a
shock as it moves through individual
sectors of the U.S. economy, using a
detailed input–output table. In principle,
this table shows how much input various
industry sectors require from other sec
tors to produce their output. The auto
mobile sector, for example, might
require material from the steel sector
amounting to 30 percent of the total cost
of producing a car, material from the
plastics sector amounting to 20 percent
of the total, and so on.
We base our analysis on the 2003
input–output table for the U.S. econ
omy. It is compiled by the Commerce
Department’s Bureau of Economic
Analysis and based on detailed bench
mark data from 1997 and updated annu
ally. The version we use divides the
American economy into 61 sectors,
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disaggregating it into 19 manufacturing
sectors and 35 service sectors. The
remaining 7 sectors include agriculture,
mining, utilities, and construction. For
each sector, the data give the cost of
the inputs from each of the 61 sectors
needed to produce a dollar’s worth
of output.
We consider the effect of a 100 percent
increase in the price of oil, equivalent to
the price of a barrel of crude going from
$30 to $60. We trace the effect of this
price increase through the 61 sectors,
calculating the resulting price increases
at two points in time, in all of the sectors
that use oil.
We designated the two points in time
round 1 and round 2. A round is the time
it takes for the typical firm to set a new
price in response to the rise in the world
price of crude; we think of a round as
the time it takes for increased costs to
be passed on to consumers. Different
industries have different patterns of
posting prices. In those sectors where
there is a strong direct link between
output and oil input, such as gasoline
at the pump, we would expect this
response to be almost immediate. In
other sectors, the increases would be
more gradual. As a rough gauge, we
would expect the full long-run price
increases to materialize in one year.
Some industries change posted prices
every day, and other do so very infre
quently. A conservative assumption is
that prices change once a quarter; in our

numerical analysis, the full effects of a
price shock pass through the economy
almost completely within four rounds.
An oil price increase means higher costs
for sectors that use this commodity as an
input. These costs are passed on to other
sectors that may not use oil directly. To
keep our analysis simple, we concentrate
on price effects only. Thus we assume
output and employment stay the same,
and by doing so don’t consider the effect
an oil shock might have on either. We
also assume the shock will have no effect
on personal incomes.
In reality, output would likely decline in
those sectors whose prices have risen
substantially, because demand will fall
as people find substitutes that cost less.
If labor markets do not adjust quickly to
sector-specific shifts in production, or if
the income effects of an oil shock are
strong, then aggregate output and
employment will be affected.
Economists don’t yet know for sure
which sectors could find substitutes for
oil or how quickly. Some suggest capital
is a general substitute for oil in the pro
duction processes of many sectors of the
economy. In other words, firms can
invest in energy-efficient equipment to
reduce their dependence on oil, but
changing established techniques of pro
duction may take many years (see Atke
son and Kehoe, 1999). Our empirical
analysis—using input–output tables with
benchmarks two decades apart—is con
sistent with their model.

Table 1 reports the eight sectors that have
the highest long-run price increases.
Here we see the concentration in the
transportation sector. However, since
fuel costs are directly or indirectly a
small part of almost every economic
activity, in the long run all sectors show
some price increase.
To understand the long-run effects,
it is useful to review the logic of an
input–output matrix. When the economy
produces a final good, it uses many
intermediate inputs. Each of these inputs
in turn uses many other inputs, and
those inputs must also be produced. An
input–output table gives precise mea
sures of this iterative process, and the
long-run effect summarizes the full cost
increases. These cost increases summa
rize the long-run effects of the oil shock
in an economy that uses existing pro
duction techniques—in 2025, it is likely
that the future economy will be even
less dependent on energy and will be
able to weather coming oil price shocks
even more readily.
The iterative process that leads from the
oil shock to overall higher prices in the
long run is not inflationary; it represents
a rise in the relative price of commodi
ties, holding factor prices constant. The
price of oil-dependent sectors is rising
relative to those sectors which are less
reliant on oil, either directly or indi
rectly. For example, the sectors with the
lowest price increase in 2003 include
insurance and financial services and
computer systems design. Goods and
services produced in these sectors are
now relatively cheaper.
To summarize the overall effect, we
construct a weighted average of the
individual sectors based on the share of
each sector’s output in final consump
tion. This aggregate effect is shown in
the final row of table 1. A 100 percent
increase in the price of crude oil, hold
ing factor prices constant, translates into
only a 3.2 percent price increase in the
typical basket of consumption goods.
Since unrefined oil itself is not a con
sumer good, the oil price shock is
passed through indirectly in the prices
of many other goods and services. Of
course, an important consumption good
is refined oil in the form of gasoline,
which has a long-run price increase of
over 83 percent, but has a weight of only
1.3 percent in the national consumption
basket. (Since our weights are based on
the input–output matrix, they do not
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correspond exactly to those used in the
well-publicized Consumer Price Index
constructed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and based on household
spending. For example, the weight of
gasoline in the CPI is about 4 percent.)
Our approach amounts to a worst-case
scenario. Since we assume perfect com
petition in every sector, higher costs are
passed on completely as higher prices.
In the long run, one way the economy
adjusts to a permanently higher real
price of oil is by adopting less oilintensive production techniques.
Certainly, this has happened before. In
1982, the same oil price shock modeled
here would have resulted in an overall
price increase of about 7 percent. The
U.S. economy has certainly become
less oil dependent by this measure.
Sharp price increases in sectors that
were heavily dependent on oil in 1982
no doubt contributed to a shift of pro
duction into less oil-intensive activities.
By 2003, the economy could sustain an
oil price shock with a lower overall
impact on prices.
■

Factor Price Effects

The analysis so far has held fixed the
combinations of intermediate goods and
also the factors of production that go
into producing final output in each
sector. This amounts to assuming that
producers will continue to use the same
intermediate inputs no matter how
expensive they get. But a permanent
increase in the price of crude oil will
no doubt change how the economy pro
duces many goods. It will also change
the mix of factors of production that are
used in each sector.
What effect will an oil price shock have
on the amount of input various industry
sectors require from other sectors? To
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answer that question, we analyzed how
the “factor prices” in the input–output
table changed over time.
Gross domestic product is measured as
the total value of output produced for
final demand or as the total value added
by all the factors of production in the
economy. The input–output table shows
spending on intermediate inputs and
also factor payments in each sector.
Value added is just the value of total
output net of the costs of intermediate
inputs. In the input–output data, value
added consists of compensation of
employees, indirect taxes, and gross
operating surplus. We will refer to com
pensation of employees as wages, and
gross operating surplus as payments to
capital. Payments to capital determine
the rate of return of capital, or what
economists often refer to as the real
interest rate.
Using new statistical techniques
(described in detail in Fisher and May
2006), we estimate with regression
analysis the factor-price changes that
best explain the pattern of price changes
observed in the input–output tables after
an oil shock. Our analysis indicates that
an oil price shock tends to raise the real
return on capital, lower the real wage,
and raise receipts from indirect busi
nesses taxes. The effect that an oil price
shock has on wages explains an impor
tant aspect of a real price change: Not
every single price in the economy can
increase in real terms. Thus some prices
must be pushed down. We are not
accustomed to thinking about real
wages as a price, but the real wage is
indeed the opportunity cost of one’s free
time. Thus the owners of capital—
people in the national economy who
have positive net wealth—will find
solace in the fact that an oil price shock
tends to increase the income from their

We also analyzed how the economy in
1982 would have reacted to the same
kind of long-run price changes. In that
case, the real wage falls and the real
interest rate rises, but the effects were
less pronounced in the data from the
table benchmarked in 1982.
■

It Still Hurts, but Maybe
Less So

Oil price shocks often take the blame
for stagflation. While we have chosen
not to examine the output effects of
such a shock, we are adamant that
the shock in itself is not inflationary.
Since price increases vary substantially
across sectors, a more accurate descrip
tion of an oil price shock is that it
causes a change in relative prices, with
those industries that use oil intensively
experiencing the highest relative price
increases. Because the sectors that
experience the highest long-run price
increases are among the most capitalintensive in the economy, the rate of
return to capital tends to rise and
economywide wages are liable to fall.
Even under the worst-case scenario,
though, the economy seems to be in a
better position to accommodate an oil
price shock than before 2000. If the
price of oil doubles, the one-time
increase in commodity prices due to the
oil increase alone averages around 3 per
cent, which is substantially less than
what would have occurred in 1982.
■
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